
Original Paper

Status of Performance Contracting in Kenya

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Abstract

The performance of governments in the delivery of services to the public – which constitutes the customers, who are also the tax payers, is affected and influenced by a multitude of factors, some controllable and others outside the control of governments (Ndubai et al., 2018). Improvement in public service delivery and the consequent increase in customer (public) satisfaction with public services have been at the core of reform programs in many developed and developing countries in the past four decades. This recent wave of reforms has compelled reversion to customer focus in many governments and changed substantially the operating environment for both elected officials and public service employees. The reversion has in many cases entailed the development of performance management systems (PMS) to facilitate execution of strategy by communicating organizational goals and objectives; reinforcing individual accountability for meeting those goals, and tracking individual and organizational performance results. Well-designed performance management systems, paired with strong political support and driven by a competent human resource, have produced amazing results impacting service delivery and the economic growth of many countries. Poor execution of the system including applying a framework that lacks appropriate leadership support and a human resource that is not equal to the complexities and dynamism of the system, often results in system failure. In order to compare the status of performance contracting in Kenya, 12 components of previous and current situation are used and way forward as well as effective remedial suggestions are provided.

1. Introduction

In the past four decades, many governments have struggled with the challenge to leverage **competitive advantage** to improve the performance of the public service, in order to increase customer (public) satisfaction with the services that they render. Regimes that have succeeded in this regard are those that have embraced the reality that what works today is a more disciplined and systematic approach to solving public sector management problems – in short, **government by design** (Farrell and Goodman (McKinsey & Company, December 2013). Government by design is one that: Favors the rational and the analytical over the purely ideological; Is willing to abandon systems and tools that no longer work; Uses verifiable evidence for decision making; Supports deliberate & thoughtful investment in expertise & skills building; and Creates closer collaboration with the private & social sectors. Clearly then, the major cause of failure by governments is in hanging onto the same/old ways of doing things and of solving problems and expecting change and improvement in service delivery.

To be able to define a clear strategic direction, *manage, measure and improve performance*, with the objective of enhancing and growing public service delivery to the highest achievable international standards, it is imperative to establish and implement a **Performance Management, Measurement and Improvement System (PMMIS)**, a system that:

- a) *supports calibration, a wider rating scale, and comparative performance rating, and thereby inspires improvement in operational efficiency and service delivery; and*
- b) *focuses on appropriate leadership and development of “people” capacities.*

The PMMIS is **(most importantly)** a tool to execute strategy by communicating organizational goals and objectives; reinforcing individual accountability for meeting those goals, and tracking individual and organizational performance results.

The main purpose of designing and implementing the system is to ensure that *performance happens by design, NOT by chance!* The institution of a Performance Management Policy should in turn precede Establishment of a PMMIS that: a. Defines public service ethos relating to efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and service delivery standards; b. Creates a platform to impel *Whole-of-Government* approach to the implementation of national development goals; and c. Codifies principles of performance management and measurement.

2. Literature Review

The key challenge practitioners and authors in the field of performance management have been grappling with in the pursuit of performance improvement has been the question of developing a flexible yet powerful model of performance measurement, management and improvement; one that is grounded in theory, supported by research, and able to communicate complex relationships while maintaining simplicity (Lopez & Hutchinson, 2013). A systemic model for performance measurement and management that is sensitive to transactional relationships across performance levels (that is, individual, group, organizational and external impact) and contexts.

Many government dispensations, in attempts to transform their public services, have developed systems that involve employees in improving organizational effectiveness by focusing them on achieving the organization's mission and strategic goals. These are essentially performance management systems (PMSs) designed for implementing strategy by communicating organizational goals and objectives, reinforcing individual accountability for meeting those goals, and tracking individual and organizational performance results. They are therefore, largely tools to address the immediate performance shortfalls, without necessarily meeting the criteria of models that are both theoretically sound and attendant to the needs of practitioners.

PT Shield on Service Tbk, a prominent Indonesia – based outsourcing company which provides, among others, technology – driven staffing solutions to national and multinational corporations, defines a Performance Management System as a framework used by companies to manage, monitor, and evaluate employee performance on an ongoing basis. The main goal of the system is to ensure that employee performance aligns with the organization's strategic objectives. A performance management system also involves competency development, providing constructive feedback, setting clear goals, and fostering a productive, positive work culture.

Among the key objectives of implementing a performance management system are therefore: Aligning Employee and Company Goals; Improving Productivity and Performance; Providing Targeted Feedback; Identifying Training and Development Needs; and Enabling Better Decision-Making. Moreover, successful performance management systems move beyond annual reviews to foster a continuous cycle of planning, monitoring, reviewing, and rewarding employee performance. The Core Components of a Successful performance Management System include Continuous Feedback: goal alignment and transparency; coaching and development; fair and objective evaluation and recognizing achievement:

Performance management systems however often fail when they are treated as administrative, once-a-year compliance events rather than continuous, developmental, and transparent dialogues. The key reasons for failure include unclear, subjective, or mismatched goals, lack of management training, infrequent feedback, and a punitive culture that undermines trust (Kabir N. Apr 17, 2025)

As Kabir Nagral posits, an effective performance management system is the backbone of a thriving organization, ensuring employees stay motivated, aligned, and productive. However, when poorly executed, it can become a source of frustration, inefficiency, and disengagement. Instead of driving performance, it creates roadblocks that hinder growth.

According to Nagral, the common issues and challenges that lead to the failure of performance management systems can be graphed as indicated in Figure 1 below:

Common Pitfalls in Performance Management Systems




Figure 1.

A well-structured performance management system should enhance efficiency and employee development. However, many organizations encounter common pitfalls that lead to frustration, disengagement, and missed goals. Figure 1 details the key factors that lead to the failure of a performance management system. Other critical reasons that make performance management systems fail include lack of leadership support and lack of strategic focus.

For it to work, management and leaders should not only support the process, but also actively drive it. A lack of commitment and engagement from senior staff leads to employees not seeing the program's benefits and beginning to drift away over time. An effective performance management system needs to ensure also that the overall strategies and goals of the company are being integrated into it to guarantee that employees are help to deliver true business value. Without that focus, the point of performance management becomes murky.

There are many and different types of performance management and measurement frameworks with variants of the core PMS tools, particularly monitoring, measurement and evaluation. The bulk of these are however, designed to drive performance in respect to revenue and profit generating organizations. Others place greater emphasis on the strategic management processes with scanty regard for measurement and evaluation. Moreover, except perhaps for the Balanced Score Card, BSC, (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), the Performance Contract, PC (Trivedi, 1994), and Berkeley Packet Filter, BPF (Brendan Gregg 2015 -2016), the bulk of the rest have not embraced measurement frameworks with balanced measures; that is, indicators that measure both financial and non-financial aspects, including processes. The BSC and the PC are the most commonly known and used; the former largely in the corporate sector and the latter mainly in the public sector.

The performance contracting system addresses three of the key problems facing public enterprises which are; ill-defined and un reconciled goals, political and bureaucratic interventions in operational decision-making and management rewards which are fixed irrespective of effort or results (Bennet, 1990). Thus, PCs aim to bring private enterprise conditions into public enterprises, and to encourage initiative, innovation and the spirit of entrepreneurship for the purpose of achieving targeted results effectively and efficiently. The objective of the performance contracting policy was to simultaneously increase managerial and operational autonomy as well as accountability (Trivedi, 1994).

3. Methodology

Public service aggregate performance, in the intervals from 2001 to 2011 and 2005 till 2011 are displayed with the help of bar charts. Significance of performance criteria for national government as

well as county governments are shown in tables and are then analysed. Recommended criteria weights are put forward for better results. Finally the economic growth before and after 2012 in Kenya has been compared.

4. Results: Performance Contracting in Kenya

4.1 Introduction

In 2003/04, the Government of Kenya introduced Performance Contracting as the public Sector PMMIS, under the aegis of the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003 – 2007). Performance Contracting was intended to be the special purpose vehicle for implementing this strategy by: Decomposing strategy into simpler, organized components for downstream implementation; Developing/sustaining implementation capabilities in the public service; Aligning employee objectives with organizational objectives; Tracking progress in project/program implementation; Measuring & evaluating periodic performance against agreed results; Linking the performance of the individual to the performance of each government department and public institution; and Linking incentives/sanctions to demonstrable performance. The system recorded enormous success in the initial years, propelling an economic growth of 7.1% in 2007, up from a measly 0.4 % in 2002!

The performance contracting system secured several international and continental awards between 2007 and 2012 and subsequently propelled the country to greater achievements in economic growth and improvement in public service delivery. Aside from the awards, the system was classified among top 20 service delivery innovations in the world in transforming government, by the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance & Innovation, at Harvard University, in 2007. More significantly, the efficiencies resultant from performance contracting enabled the country to finance 94% of its budgetary requirements from internally generated resources! Implementation of the system also demonstrated amply that efficiency and effectiveness of the public service is the foundation of competitive advantage for a country and that this also defines and informs the efficiency and effectiveness of all other sectors of the economy, including the private sector. Indeed, as *Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad*, once put it, “The quality of an effective Government cannot be lower than that of its clients – specifically the private sector”. In 2012, a research carried out by the Public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting in the Office of the Prime Minister demonstrated this aspect, showing that the performance of the economy moved roughly in tandem with movement in the performance of the public service, as indicated in Figures.

Public Service Aggregate Performance




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

Efficiency of the public sector clearly forms the glass ceiling for the efficiency of the private sector. The singular factor that underwrote the success of performance contracting in Kenya was the unequivocal support at the highest level in government. The direction to introduce performance contracting was issued by the then Head of State in 2003 and he supported it consistently thereafter by presiding over public signing of performance contracts by cabinet ministers and public announcement of results every year until he left office in 2012.

Along the way however and after 2013, a number of developments that compromised the feasibility of the hitherto internationally acclaimed system took place. The aftermath of the compromise of the integrity of the system has wreaked dire consequences on the performance of not only the public service, but also the Kenyan economy. The issue here then is about reverting to what has *worked* before.

4.2 Situational Analysis

Twelve components are used to compare the previous and current position regarding the status of performance contracting and its consequences in Kenya.

i. Domicile of Administration

In countries that have recorded phenomenal success in the implementation of PMMIS, including the USA, South Korea, India and China, the administration of Performance Contracting, as a management and performance accountability system, is domiciled strategically at the center of government and in/under an office with veritable dominion over the public service. The domicile is not about the prestige of hosting a system that touches on every public institution. It is about the ubiquity of the authority of the office that by law and practice, allows it to enforce unquestionable compliance by all public institutions and individuals, both vertically and horizontally. In the USA, the system of performance contracting was placed strategically in the office of Vice President Al Gore, when President Bill Clinton introduced it in 1992.

Current position

In the initial years (2004 – 2008) the system was domiciled in the Office of the Head of Public Service, and coordinated by the then Performance Contracting Secretariat, which was to morph to Public Sector Reform and Performance Contracting in the Prime Minister's Office in mid-2008. This ensured that each and every office in the public service, including State House, all ministries, departments and agencies, devolved units, universities, tertiary institutions and constitutional offices subscribed to the

system.

Following the advent of the Jubilee government, it moved variously to the then Ministry of Devolution and Planning, State House, and later to the Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs. Aside from the conflict of interest implicit in domiciling the system in institutions that should have subscribed to it, the decision to scatter it to different institutions also craftily excluded these institutions from the close scrutiny envisaged under the system.

The system is currently domiciled in the office of the Prime Cabinet Secretary, following publication of Executive Order No. 1 of 2023. Clearly, the system has not only been bereft of the critical requisite of centrality in government, but has unpredictably shifted domicile since 2013 which is inconsistent with the requirement that a strong accountability system requires a predictable abode, in order to inspire deference by subscribers.

ii. Functional Overlaps

To forestall the risk of creating confusion among the institutions subscribing to performance contracting, it is imperative that administration and monitoring of the achievement on performance indicators should be carried out centrally.

Current position

The key performance contract criteria for ministries and other public institutions is “core mandate” (hitherto referred to as “operations”). This is a key criterion with a dominant weight of 60%! A critical indicator under the criteria is “project completion rate” The function of monitoring this indicator is however also carried out by the department of Government Delivery Services (formerly Presidential Delivery Unit), now under the Prime Cabinet Secretary.

iii. Misplacement and Mix - up of Criteria and Indicators

Performance indicators should **never** be mistaken for performance criteria or vice versa. Evaluation focuses on achievements on performance indicators, NOT performance criteria! When indicators are set out as criteria, it puts the evaluator in a quandary, because a criterion must encompass indicators under it for the purpose of assessment. The previous PC Matrices had the following 5 clear performance criteria, under which various indicators were listed:

Finance and Stewardship; Service Delivery; Non-Financial; Operations; and Dynamic/Qualitative

Current position

The current PC Matrix contains the following seven performance ‘criteria’:

1. Financial Stewardship; 2. Service Delivery; 3. Core Mandate; 4. Implementation of Presidential Directives; 5. Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO); 6. Promotion of Local Content in Procurement; and Cross – Cutting.

Items 4, 5, 6, and 7 are NOT consummate performance criteria. “Implementation of Presidential Directives” (item 4), should essentially be listed simply as “Presidential Directives”, in order that the actual ‘directive’ can be listed thereunder. Further, items 5 and 6 are performance indicators, not criteria. Item 7 is so awfully mixed up that except for “Corruption Prevention” all the others should be performance indicators under “Dynamic & Qualitative” criterion. This kind of situation confuses both the users, negotiators and evaluators! It also makes it difficult to reference performance indicators to the Sector Performance Standards which were documented in 2010.

iv. Negotiation and Evaluation

To engender public trust and confidence in the administration of the system, particularly identification of priority performance areas and performance targets, and the credibility of performance results, it is imperative to employ the services of independent external experts as negotiators and evaluators. This is to forestall public scepticism of the system as a masquerade, where government is identifying its own (not public) priorities, unilaterally setting targets, and evaluating its own performance! It must be noted that independent external negotiators bring along and infuse fresh and independent perspectives to the

entire process, because they essentially represent the public (the Mwananchi) and are able to, in the process, factor in what the public, as government customers desire.

From inception of the system in 2004 through to 2013, the government engaged independent external experts as negotiators and evaluators from a multitude of sectors, including the private sector, academia, professional and religious bodies, who worked largely on voluntary basis.

Current Position

The independent external dimension featuring external experts to negotiate indicators and targets and to evaluate performance no longer exists, again since 2013! The identification and negotiation of targets for ministries and evaluation of their performance are carried out by the Performance Contracting unit in the Prime Cabinet Secretary's office, while in the case of downstream institutions, negotiation and evaluation are carried out by respective parent ministries! This is, to say the least, a travesty and total mockery of a system that was once acclaimed continentally and beyond!

v. Significance Attached to Performance Criteria

Performance Criteria are individually weighted, as a convention, to signify the importance the nation attaches to each area of national development. Nearly all governments in the world recognize that their existence is predicated on growing excellence in public service delivery. They accordingly attach commensurately higher weight to the "Service Delivery" criterion, while recognizing that majority of the other criteria, including 'Finance & Stewardship', 'Operations' (or what is currently referred to as 'Core Mandate'), 'Non – Financial', and 'Corruption Prevention', are essentially enablers, to facilitate delivery of public services.

Current Position

Public Service Delivery has since 2013, been subordinated to the point of obscurity in the current performance contracts, in both the national and county governments. Tables (i) and (ii) below demonstrate this position:

Table 1.

SIGNIFICANCE OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA - NATIONAL GOVERNMENT				
	PREVIOUS		CURRENT	
No.	Criteria	Wt.%	Criteria	Wt.%
1	Finance & Stewardship	20	Finance & Stewardship	10
2	Service Delivery	25	Service Delivery	10
3	Operations	25	Core Mandate*	60

**note the change of criteria name*

Table 2.

SIGNIFICANCE OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA - COUNTY GOVERNMENTS				
	PREVIOUS		CURRENT	
No.	Criteria	Wt.%	Criteria	Wt.%
1	Finance & Stewardship	20	Finance & Stewardship	10
2	Service Delivery	25	Service Delivery	8
3	Operations	25	Core Mandate*	60

**note the change of criteria name*

vi. Capacity Building

The success of performance contracting is founded on capacity building through continuous training of key implementing groups in subscribing institutions. This is in recognition of the dynamics of the public service where attrition through retirements, transfers, re-designations, resignations and dismissals are unavoidable realities. Training also keeps the fire burning, and is a forum for infusing emerging developments for a subject that has continued to attract new innovations. In the period 2004 to 2012, training was carried out annually for implementing teams in all public institutions by the Public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting Department. It would also be dispensed selectively to new groups or on request.

Current Position

To put it succinctly, capacity building relating to performance contracting is carried out only selectively for institutions that request for it.

vii. Inter – and Intra Sector Negotiations

For performance contracting to have an impact on the growth of the economy, it must be implemented on the platform of the “**whole – of – government**” approach to the achievement of national goals and objectives. This is essentially recognition of ministerial and departmental interdependencies. In virtually all cases, the success of one institution is tied to or dependent on another institution performing some pertinent functions. For example, to construct a road in an urban setting, the Roads department may need the Energy and Water ministries to manage their underground cable/piping infrastructure. Ministry of Agriculture may require the Lands Ministry to alienate land. All of them may require the services of the Attorney - General to sort out pertinent legal issues. This is because the workings of a government are similar to a production process or a grinding mill; if one area fails, or a cog in the grinding mill breaks, the entire system is compromised. Inter – and Intra Sector Negotiations have been convened before commencement of actual negotiations all along between 2004 and 2012. The critical purpose of this platform is to allow institutions in various sectors to exchange views on their performance dispositions and to particularly agree on the nature of assistance they would require from each other in order to effectively implement their performance contracts. This then forms the foundation for the “**whole – of – government**” approach.

Current Position

Forums of this nature no longer take place.

viii. Pre – Negotiation Consultations

As the external independent negotiators prepare to embark on negotiations, many of them may not be familiar with the institution, because they are not public servants, may not have ever worked in the public service, or may have been rotated from negotiating with other institutions. Pre – Negotiation Consultations enable negotiators to obtain a helicopter view of the institution, preparing them with the familiarity they need to effectively negotiate performance targets with the institution.

Current Position

Perhaps because external independent negotiators no longer exist, this platform also does not feature.

ix. Engagement of External Stakeholders in Performance Tracking and Feedback on implementation of Service Delivery Charters

The consumers of the services - the public - either directly or through representative lobby groups such as the National Taxpayers Association (NTA), Kenya Alliance of Resident Association (KARA), Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), among many others, can only attest the effectiveness of service delivery by the government. This dimension was actively exploited to establish levels of customer satisfaction with public services between 2006 and 2009, when a comprehensive nationwide customer satisfaction survey was carried out.

Current Position

With the downscaling of service delivery in performance contracts, this platform is no longer in subsistence.

x. Performance Incentives and Sanctions

Employees need to be continually motivated to particularly walk the extra mile to achieve results beyond normal expectation. The obvious and straight-forward incentives solution is emoluments, where employees are rewarded with salary increments or the thirteenth month pay. Others are promotions or recognition with state decorations or certificates. There are also those that are joyriders and do not achieve or help to achieve targets. These need to be sanctioned where training does not impact significantly on their performance. This arrangement worked well until 2012, when the last known performance incentive was awarded to top performers, on the basis of computed composite scores, underwriting the deliberate linkage between individual and institutional performance.

Current Position

The performance incentives and sanctions program have not been applied in the last 10 years.

xi. Public Announcement of Performance Evaluation Results

In countries such as India, where public service performance is taken devotedly, public announcement of performance evaluation results, which is presided over by both the President and the Prime Minister, becomes a moment of enormous pride for top performers and disdain for poor performers. This is also the case in Rwanda, which has recorded momentous progress in implementation of performance contracting, after obtaining requisite performance contracting training in Kenya. Public announcement of results therefore acts as a powerful incentive for performers, and sanction for non-performers. It also signifies support for this accountability instrument at the highest possible level, thereby engendering unequivocal compliance. Between 2006 and 2012, public announcement of performance evaluation results in Kenya was presided over by H.E. the President and later by both the President and the Prime Minister.

Current Position

Performance evaluation results have not been publicly announced or disclosed since 2012.

xii. Coverage of Performance Contract Implementation

To achieve the unity of purpose that underwrites the ‘whole – of – government’ approach to public sector performance and composite achievement of national goals and objectives, every institution whose continued survival is dependent - directly or indirectly – on exchequer funding, must subscribe to performance contracting as a means of accountability to the public. This had been the case until 2012. Hitherto, the country had achieved near total inclusivity in bringing institutions on-board, including several constitutional commissions and independent bodies. Such commissions as the Teachers Service Commission and the Public Service Commission were veritable and active participants.

Current Position

Currently, the only active constitutional commission is reported to be the Teachers Service Commission, while all the others, including independent offices, have been “allowed” to give the process a wide berth.

4.3 Recommendations

As mentioned earlier, the aftermath of the compromise of the integrity of the system has wreaked dire consequences on the performance of not only the public service, but also the Kenyan economy. Thus, 10 point specific suggestions are provided to put performance contracting back on track, so that economy as well as overall prosperity of Kenyan people can be achieved.

Political and executive leadership

There is need for government to recognize that accountability for results “trickles down” and NEVER

“trickles up”; the momentum for the effective implementation and delivery of the system should therefore emanate from the highest office in the land; the system must, of essence, be driven by political will at the highest level of government. The system must therefore be driven from the Office of the President, under the aegis of the Head of Public Service, as the office with the unfettered authority to enforce compliance

Coverage of the performance contracting system

All public institutions that draw funding from the exchequer for continued survival, or that are mandated by government to generate or otherwise attract revenue/funding outside of the exchequer, whether directly or indirectly, should be brought on board the performance contracting regimen. This will enkindle the benefits of the “whole – of – government” approach to the achievement of national projects and programs. These include all MDAs, County Governments, Tertiary institutions, Constitutional Commissions and Independent Offices. Ultimately the national assembly and the judiciary should be brought on board.

a. Public Service Delivery

Public Service Delivery should be accorded deliberate prominence in all instruments of accountability. Other performance criteria are in essence enablers to facilitate and support efficient public service delivery; further, the citizen should be given a wide latitude to participate in the dimension of governance relating to priority performance coordinates and the effectiveness of service delivery initiatives;

b. Involvement of external stakeholders

Cognizance should be given to the role of external ad hoc stakeholders in bolstering public trust and confidence in government by participating (on behalf of the citizen) in identification of priority performance areas, determination of performance targets and expected levels of achievement, and subsequent evaluation of performance. External ad hoc negotiation and evaluation stakeholders should, going forward, be engaged all along the process of performance contracting, not out of expediency but out of necessity.

c. Management of negotiations

The processes of targets negotiation, pre – negotiation consultations, and inter - sector and intra – sector negotiations must of essence be re-established.

d. Structure of the Performance Contract Matrix

The Performance contract (PC) Matrix should be rationalised, with the additional “Presidential Agenda” to be considered and evaluated only when it is populated, and with an attendant budget by the institution under which it will fall. The weight attached to it (designated as “F”), will be a floating weight, which will be drawn from the criteria it will fall under, in negotiated proportion. The rationale here is that a scheme drawn from a presidential directive must, of essence, fall under any of the listed criteria, and should therefore not be allowed to constitute double counting in evaluation. Rationalising the PC Matrix will also resolve the challenges of misplacement and mix-up of criteria and indicators and functional overlaps.

e. Target Sector Hearings

In the spirit of the broad citizen involvement in the implementation of the PC, consideration must be given to holding of sector hearings of performance targets, in the similar lines to budget sector hearings, to secure public assent and ownership of the performance trajectory of the government. These are performance targets of public agencies meant to bring the public on board to participate in setting and owning.

f. Incentives/Sanctions

Appropriate incentives/sanctions programs, based on measurable performance at both institutional and individual levels, need to be instituted to motivate and reward exceptional performance and sanction poor performance. In both cases the rating of performance must be premised on composite scoring.

g. Signing of Performance Contracts

All Cabinet Secretaries must sign Performance Contracts with H.E. the President, and subsequently cascade their commitments to all downstream departments and institutions. This should compel them to assume full responsibility for all aspects of performance in their respective ministries.

h. Performance Accountability by County Governments

County Governors should, going forward, be required to sign performance contracts with H.E. the President, as a way of not only underwriting accountability for the funds dispensed to them under the constitution, but also burgeoning the 'whole – of – government' approach to the achievement of national goals and aspirations.

i. Public announcement of performance results

Public announcement of results needs to be reinstated. This constitutes the greatest opportunity and forum for performers to take their place of pride in being publicly recognised and poor performers to savour the consequences of inertia.

Finally the recommended criteria, with corresponding weight factors (in percentages) is shown in the following Table3. The service delivery to the consumers is one of the important aspects for the undertaken task and has been allocated one fourth weight, as it would result in customer satisfaction.

Operations are considered equally important aspect (with one fourth weight), as outcomes would be directly related to the efficient as well as effective execution of the undertaken project

Table 3.

	No.	RECOMMENDED CRITERIA WEIGHT
1	Finance & Stewardship	20
2	Non - Financial	15
3	Service Delivery	25
4	Operations	25
5	Dynamic/Quantitative	10
6	Corruption Eradication	5
7	Presidential Agenda	F

5. Conclusion

As observed earlier in this article, the aftermath of the compromise of the integrity of the system has significantly affected the performance of not only the public service, but also the Kenyan economy. Subsequent years (after 2012), with the exception of 2021, recorded decreasing economic growth rates as the table below shows:

Table 4.

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
%	7.1	1.7	3.3	5.4	4.5	4.7	4.7	5.3	5.6	5.9	4.9	6.3	5.6	-2.7	7.6	4.9	5.6	4.7	5.0

The country has enormous potential for rebound, if deliberate energy is directed toward implementing

the recommendations listed above and appropriate strategic direction given to the country's public service. This should ensure that every public institution that draws funding from the exchequer directly or indirectly, or is enabled - one way or another – by the government to generate funding from within or without, performs optimally, in order to contribute to the growth of the economy. The strategy should equally target and bring on board both the national assembly and the judiciary. Non - selective inclusivity is the only way to ensure 'whole – of – government' concert in achieving national goals and objectives.

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